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his synthesis is based on the most important issues aired in the course of the debate on the key issues in 
the negotiations for a Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) currently underway 
between the European Union and the United States organised by Notre Europe – Jacques Delors Institute and 
the European Policy Centre (EPC) in Brussels on 27 November 2013.
Experts at a seminar organised by Notre Europe – 
Jacques Delors Institute and the European Policy Centre 
(EPC) in Brussels on 27 November 2013 explored the 
key issues in the negotiations for a Transatlantic Trade 
and Investment Partnership (TTIP) currently under-
way between the European Union and the United 
States, starting with the lessons learnt from the con-
struction of the single market and from previous com-
mercial agreements. The debates were introduced by 
a presentation from Pascal Lamy, honorary president 
of Notre Europe – Jacques Delors Institute  and former 
director of the WTO, and from Ignacio Garcia Bercero, 
the European Commission’s chief negotiator, François 
Heisbourg, special adviser to the Fondation pour la 
Recherche Stratégique (FRS), Peter S. Rashish, senior 
adviser to the EPC and former vice-president of the 
US Chamber of commerce for Europe and Eurasia, 
Paula Wilson, New Zealand’s deputy head of mis-
sion to the EU and ambassador to Belgium, Jonathan 
Faull, the European Commission’s director general 
for the internal market, Marc Vanheukelen, head of 
cabinet of EU trade commissioner Karel De Gucht, 
Bruno Liebhaberg, director general of the Centre on 
Regulation in Europe (CERRE) and Jacques Pelkmans, 
a senior researcher with the Centre for European 
Policy Studies (CEPS). This synthesis is based on the 
most important issues aired in the course of the debate 
– issues which will be pursued in greater depth in the 
course of future projects. 
Introduction
While negotiations on the TTIP were officially 
launched at the G8 meeting in Northern Ireland 
on 17 June 2013, the notion of a bilateral free-trade 
area between the United States and Europe actually 
dates back to the 1990s and was actively promoted in 
Europe by the United Kingdom and by Germany.
The difficulties encountered in getting the negotia-
tions off the ground have been caused by the specific 
nature of the project, which is different from all pre-
vious commercial agreements. No similar agreement 
exists between two partners carrying such similar, 
and massive economic weight – not even the recent 
Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement, 
CETA, which the EU signed with Canada in October 
2013 (the first agreement signed with a G8 member 
country, but one in which the EU’s weight far outstrips 
that of its partner). Canada accounted for almost 2% 
of the world’s GDP in 2012, as opposed to 23.2% for 
the EU and 21.8% for the United States. Together, the 
EU and the United States account for some $30 tril-
lion in annual output, which accounts for just under 
half of the world’s overall economy. In terms of sheer 
volume, trade between the two partners accounts for 
fully 30% of all trade worldwide.
By the same token, the negotiating mandate assigned 
to the European Commission by the European 
Parliament and the European Council on 14 June last 
year is far broader than it has ever been for previous 
commercial agreements. It includes both traditional 
issues such as access for goods and services to pri-
vate and public markets, investment, restrictions of 
the subsidies and so forth. But over and above the cut 
in customs tariffs, which are already fairly minimal 
between the EU and the United States as things stand 
T
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today1, the most decisive issue involved in this proj-
ect concerns non-tariff barriers: the elimination of dis-
crepancies between regulations which will facilitate 
the functioning of global production chains – the new 
crucial issue in the globalisation process and in what 
Pascal Lamy calls the “Geneva consensus” –, is going 
to have a far greater impact on the growth of trade 
than the mere reduction of tariffs.
Yet as things stand today, the TTIP negotiations 
are reminiscent of a play by Pirandello entitled Six 
Characters in Search of an Author, a play whose script 
has not yet been written. It falls to the actors to write 
the story that has put them on the stage.
Numerous parameters in the negotiations are still 
open and have yet to be clarified by the negotiators 
in order to choose the negotiating method most likely 
to allow the project to be successfully completed and 
to meet the approval of their mandators. First of all, 
what do these negotiations aim to achieve on both 
the economic and geostrategic levels? What are the 
ground rules? Who are the main players? And last but 
not least, how should the negotiating timeframe be 
managed?
1. What is the aim of these negotiations?
1.1. The geoeconomic goal
The negotiators on both sides claim that the aim is 
not to forge a single transatlantic market akin to the 
European single market, which rests on a common 
judicial system, common rule-making procedures, a 
common enforcement system and so forth. 
The primary lever in this agreement which, according 
to the mandate, is intended to impart a fresh thrust 
to economic growth both in the EU and in the United 
States by boosting their mutual trade, concerns regu-
latory convergence.
First of all, tariffs barriers are designed to shield 
producers against competition from imports, while 
non-tariff barriers are designed more to protect the 
consumer and their primary aim is to increase the 
consumer’s level of prosperity by preventing hidden 
risks in the use of a given product, a negative impact 
on the environment, or compatibility problems with a 
product due to lack of coordination among manufac-
turers. Thus standards and norms concern such issues 
as precaution, risk management and, ultimately, what 
a community sees as being good or bad, an aspect 
commonly referred to by the term “collective pref-
erences”. Difficulties in regulatory convergence are 
caused by the fact that it touches on sensitive values.
Secondly, unlike custom barriers where the aim is to 
reduce those barriers to zero, regulatory convergence 
does not seek to eliminate regulations but to eliminate 
the discrepancies between trade partners’ existing 
regulatory environments, both in the field of Sanitary 
and phytosanitary measures (SPS) and of Technical 
barriers to trade (TBT).
The more political and technically far more complex 
nature of this regulatory convergence compared to 
the mere reduction or elimination of customs tar-
iffs and subsidies explains why this area has as yet 
been relatively little explored in commercial agree-
ments. Yet regulatory convergence, which allows busi-
nesses to benefit from major economies of scale and to 
achieve far more significant economic benefits than 
they could through reductions in customs tariffs, is 
going to be the major challenge in all future commer-
cial agreements. 
Market interpenetration would also be facilitated by 
the cut in administrative costs that could result from 
mutual recognition of the equivalence of certification 
systems (for instance, in order to avoid a single prod-
uct from having to be tested twice) and from a simpli-
fication of the rules of origin.
The impact of this opening up to competition is going 
to vary from one member state to another and from 
one economic sector to another. But the overall ben-
efits expected by the European Commission both in 
terms of comprehensive job creation and of the annual 
benefit per household (545 euros) could represent an 
annual benefit of 120 billion euros, in other words an 
additional 0.5% of GDP per year, for the EU as a whole.
Such benefits are going to depend also on the range of 
economic sectors impacted by the negotiations.
The mandate assigned to the European Commission 
concerns the sectors of chemistry, the pharmaceuti-
cal industry, the defence industry, aerospace engi-
neering, automobile construction, intellectual prop-
erty, the service industry (with the financial sector 
topping the bill), agriculture, energy and other sec-
tors that are particularly sensitive to environmental 
regulations. On the other hand, it rules out defence 
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procurements and, for the time being, also the audio-
visual media field.
The list, however, has yet to be finalised with the 
chief negotiator on the American side of the fence (the 
United States Trade Representative – USTR). The fact 
that the USTR agreed in the second round of negotia-
tions in November 2013 to include financial services 
in the negotiations met one of the Europeans’ most 
fervent expectations.
The economic benefits also depend on the degree of 
regulatory convergence already achieved between 
the two shores of the Atlantic in the economic sector, 
and on the degree of ambition and perseverance of the 
negotiators – the wider the original gap, the greater 
the benefits that can be achieved through regulatory 
convergence.
Lastly, the benefits of the TTIP are going to depend 
in the longer term on the two partners’ ability to pro-
mote transatlantic standards on the world market, 
in other words they are going to depend on the new 
dynamics in bilateral, regional or multilateral negotia-
tions that the two partners prove capable of promot-
ing in the broader global marketplace. 
In addition to the economic aspect of the TTIP project, 
there are also other strategic interests that are linked 
to the geostrategic context in which the negotiations 
are taking place.
1.2. The geostrategic goal
Trade policy may have its own rationale, its own lan-
guage and its own sphere of autonomy, but it remains 
tied to broader strategic issues. Trade policy is inex-
tricably bound to soft power: its importance and its 
autonomy tend to decrease when hard power takes 
over, as in wartime or during the Cold War (during 
which, trade relations were used as tools in the con-
frontation between the two blocs). At other times, 
however, trade policy can become a vehicle for stra-
tegic shifts.
Thus the two parties’ commitment needs to be anal-
ysed in the light of their respective history and of the 
strategic use each has made of its trade policy to date. 
The United States, thanks to its geographical posi-
tion, has always accorded vital strategic interest to 
access to global markets, in particular through mari-
time routes. But its involvement on the international 
scene is functional and multilateralism continues to 
be a default mode for the United States – a position 
bolstered by the relative autonomy that the continen-
tal American market has now achieved in the energy 
sphere.
Moreover, the United States’ ability to ensure free 
access to resources and global markets is also being 
challenged both regionally, as in the China Sea, a 
strategic crossroads of world trade, and functionally, 
with cyber-threats and anti-satellite operations likely 
to increase as a result of China’s militarisation. The 
United States’ power has been eroded by the devel-
opment of China’s power, by the repercussions of its 
engagement in Iraq and, more recently, by espionage 
issues.
This is prompting the United States to strengthen 
its soft power with other partners along two differ-
ent axes: to the west, by negotiating a TransPacific 
Partnership (TPP) with eleven countries in the Pacific 
region which would account for almost 40% of global 
trade, and to the east, by negotiating the TTIP which, 
we should remember, would account for 30% of global 
trade. This would allow the United States to bolster 
its commercial position while pursuing a containment 
policy of China’s power.
The EU shares the same ambition of opening markets 
while pursuing its objectives of regulation by global 
governance. But its commercial, political and norma-
tive power is being eroded as the global economic 
weight that it carries decreases and as its military and 
diplomatic capabilities are hit by budget cuts. It needs 
to cope simultaneously with its commercial depen-
dence on China and its still strong dependence on the 
United States’ military capabilities. Thus its default 
mode is rather a combination of multilateralism (pref-
erably within the context 0f the WTO) and of depen-
dence on the United States for its security. 
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Thus in sending out a reassuring signal on the alliance 
between these two traditional partners, the TTIP is 
viewed as an answer to the concern triggered by the 
United States’ “shift” towards the Pacific and its rela-
tive disengagement from the EU’s area of influence. 
After the United States announced that it would be 
slashing $500 billion from its defence budget, a move 
which is going to impact the sum of $731 billion that 
it was still earmarking for NATO in 2011 (accounting 
for approximately 75% of its overall spending), people 
have thus been able to hail the transatlantic agree-
ment as a new kind of economic NATO.
It is in the United States’ interest to contain China’s 
economic expansion and to ensure access to the 
region’s markets in order for it to maintain its sta-
tus as the world’s leading power. Unlike its partner, 
who is engaging simultaneously on both the Atlantic 
and Pacific fronts, the EU seems for its part to have 
a less clear strategy towards the Pacific, despite the 
recent start of negotiations on an investment agree-
ment with China or previous agreements signed with 
South Korea and the agreement currently in force 
with Japan, which are designed to allow it to work its 
way into the trade networks in the constantly growing 
Asian markets.
2. What are the rules of the negotiations?
2.1. Harmonisation and/or mutual recognition?
The method to be adopted in the march towards reg-
ulatory convergence has not yet been decided. The 
Europeans can benefit from the lessons that they have 
learned from their daily experience of harmonisation 
and mutual recognition in the construction of the sin-
gle market.
Harmonisation is the process that equalises the laws, 
regulations, standards and practices of different coun-
tries so that the same rules are applied to businesses 
operating on their territory. Mutual recognition, for its 
part, is based on a principle of equivalence allowing a 
country to grant access to its markets to businesses 
from another country on condition that they meet the 
standards in force in their own country of origin. Thus 
the principle of equivalence admits the possibility that 
different sets of regulations may aim to achieve the 
same objectives.
Harmonisation is pursued where there is a major dis-
parity between the different levels of regulation. It has 
most often been the case in trade negotiations between 
countries carrying asymmetrical economic weight, 
as for instance in the Deep and Comprehensive Free 
Trade Agreement (DCFTA) signed by the EU with the 
countries in its immediate neighbourhood, that the 
EU’s negotiating lever has allowed it to put in place 
a form of harmonisation aiming at the adoption of the 
Community acquis.
The principle of mutual recognition was adopted in the 
EU following the European Court of Justice’s Cassis de 
Dijon ruling, although the construction of the single 
market has in point of fact been the result of a combi-
nation of both harmonisation and mutual recognition.
In the case of the TTIP, the goal of the negotiations 
being different from that of a single market and the 
two partners’ relative weight being fairly balanced, 
the question of the modalities for achieving conver-
gence remains an open one. Mutual recognition agree-
ments are more effective if both sides have a similar 
level of protection and security, if both partners’ regu-
latory bodies trust one another and if it is possible to 
refer to existing international standards.
Unlike harmonisation, which demands a lengthy nego-
tiation process, mutual recognition is more flexible 
and simpler for regulations already in force because it 
does not have the same legal, financial or psychologi-
cal implications. In certain common sectors such as 
aerospace engineering (between Boeing and Airbus), 
agencies regulating companies’ activities have 
already been working on the basis of mutual recogni-
tion for many years.
The TTIP negotiations could therefore accord prior-
ity to mutual recognition for existing regulations and 
to harmonisation for the future regulations of leading-
edge sectors (such as nanotechnology, electric vehi-
cles, smart networks and so forth), based on the prin-
ciple that it is easier to set up a common regulatory 
environment when no such environment exists in the 
first place. Or we might also end up seeing a combi-
nation of the two, with regulations subject to mutual 
recognition containing a minimal number of (harmon-
ised) common principles.
Furthermore, before addressing regulatory conver-
gence between existing norms and standards, pri-
ority might be accorded to the establishment of a 
 5 / 12 
THE TTIP NEGOTIATIONS: A PIRANDELLO PLAY
system addressing future regulations. The creation 
of a Transatlantic Regulatory Cooperation Council 
making it possible to ensure that standards for future 
leading-edge sectors are common from the outset 
would turn the TTIP into an ongoing process of trans-
atlantic integration, rather than merely adopting a 
lengthier and more complex ex-ante approach.
And lastly, convergence does not concern only the 
adoption of norms and standards but also the imple-
mentation of those norms and standards on the ground 
(for instance, certification) and the monitoring of that 
implementation. Legally binding procedures must be 
put in place to harmonise that implementation if it is to 
produce cost-cutting economies of scale.
2.2. Horizontal and/or sectoral approach?
Multilateral trade negotiations on customs tar-
iffs adopt a horizontal approach, while the sec-
toral approach is preferred in the case of regulatory 
convergence.
The magnitude of the discrepancies between regu-
lations adopted on either side of the Atlantic varies 
from one economic sector to the next, whether it is 
the financial sector, the automobile industry, cosmet-
ics, pharmaceutical products or chemical products, 
and so they demand a specific sectoral approach. In 
the field of chemical products, for instance, the dis-
crepancies between regulations in the EU and in the 
United States are far more substantial than they are 
in the automobile industry, where it would be easier to 
achieve a consensus.
Yet the EU and the United States hold different views 
regarding the choice of a horizontal or sectoral 
approach. Europe would prefer prior framing in a hor-
izontal approach, which would then make it possible 
to address the issues from a sectoral viewpoint. This, 
because the unique way in which Europe’s institu-
tions function means that the European Commission 
is inclined to seek a preemptive agreement among its 
member states with regard to certain crucial prin-
ciples before engaging in sectoral negotiations. The 
United States, on the other hand, is accustomed to 
intense sectoral lobby activity and so it does not wish 
to waste time in theoretical debates about the hori-
zontal approach, preferring to engage directly in a 
sectoral approach. A “multilateral plus” approach 
combining a few horizontal principles with a sectoral 
approach is a compromise that might be envisaged.
3. Who are the players in this game?
3.1. The leading players
The USTR and the European Commission, the TTIP’s 
official negotiators, are two bodies that have built up 
considerable experience in the field of commercial 
negotiations. Yet the complexity and the scope of these 
negotiations raises the question of the expertise that 
they have available to them to conduct the negotiations 
and also the means to avoid the kind of overcrowding 
and congestion that might cause the negotiations to 
grind to a halt. This, particularly on the American side 
because the United States has to address two nego-
tiation fronts simultaneously, namely the TPP and the 
TTIP.
Also, procedures for ratifying the agreement are not 
the same on either side of the Atlantic. The European 
Parliament is not taking part in the negotiations. It 
will be informed step by step and it will be tasked, 
along with the twenty-eight member states, to ratify 
the final agreement. And the European Parliament, 
along with the Council, are to be sent the points that 
have been thrashed out only after the event, their 
room for manoeuvre being reduced to simply “taking 
or leaving” whatever agreement has been reached.
The US Congress, for its part, has not yet approved the 
renewal of the fast-track procedure allowing the pres-
ident of the United States to negotiate international 
agreements that lawgivers can then only approve or 
reject, but not modify in any way. Taking into account 
both the workload being piled on the shoulders of the 
staffers whose job it is to ensure that Congress ratifies 
each stage in the TPP and TTIP negotiations and the 
potential requests for amendments or the vetoes that 
that activity might entail, Congress’s failure to renew 
the fast-track procedure may well end up obstructing 
the negotiations.
It is also going to be important in the negotiations to 
be able to rely on the cooperation of the regulatory 
bodies. These bodies entertain different relations with 
the representatives of industry on either side of the 
Atlantic (their ties are closer in Europe than they are 
in the United States, where the regulatory bodies tend 
to mark their distance from industry) but their bilat-
eral relations based on many years of shared experi-
ence in negotiations may help to establish a dialogue 
based on mutual trust.
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3.2. The involvement of stakeholders
While the EU has already signed almost fifty commer-
cial agreements in the world and is currently negotiat-
ing twelve new commercial agreements (with Japan, 
India, Malaysia, Vietnam, Morocco and so forth), 
these latter negotiations regularly fail to arouse the 
same degree of grass-roots interest or to spark the 
same reactions as the TTIP.
• Producers versus consumers
Unlike all previous negotiations, which have been of 
greater concern to producers, in the case of the TTIP 
we should expect greater attention from consum-
ers. This, because the political aspect of the negotia-
tions is highlighted by the general view that Europe’s 
citizens and consumers have of the level of precau-
tion required in the areas of health, data protection 
and the environment, which is higher than that held 
by their counterparts in the United States. The fear 
that, in helping to lower current standards, the TTIP 
will be less beneficial for them than for producers is 
absolutely tangible. Yet the same concern is also har-
boured by American consumers.
A detailed comparative analysis of the way this risk is 
addressed on both sides of the Atlantic must be made 
on a sector-by-sector basis (regarding the environ-
ment, public health, safety and so forth). For instance, 
the Volcker rule adopted by the United States in the 
wake of the financial crisis in an attempt to contain 
speculative investment is bolder than the equiva-
lent rule adopted in Europe. The United States has 
shown greater concern for consumer protection than 
the EU in the sphere of financial regulation. Europe’s 
REACH rule on chemical products, on the other hand, 
is stricter in terms of compliance with the principle of 
precaution than the equivalent US rule. And yet the 
United States has adopted certain standards in the 
environmental sphere that are stricter than those in 
force in Europe, where we are still bound to the “pol-
luter pays” principle.
To address this new and sensitive issue in commercial 
negotiations and gain the support of the consumer, 
transparency and consultation of all stakeholders is 
of the essence in order to ensure that the project is 
successful.
• Transparency
Information regarding the progress being made in 
these bilateral negotiations is a more sensitive issue 
than it is with multilateral negotiations, which are 
by definition more open. The European Parliament’s 
rejection en bloc in 2012 of the Anti-Counterfeiting 
Trade Agreement – ACTA, which had attracted strong 
criticism for having being negotiated by the European 
Commission behind closed doors, is a precedent that 
must not be repeated. Learning the lesson from that 
failure entails paying special attention to the issue of 
transparency in the conduct of the TTIP negotiations 
in order to allow NGOs, professional federations and 
the representatives of associations or academic play-
ers to be properly informed of all the stages in the 
negotiation process.
While communication is restricted by the confiden-
tiality required in the conduct of any kind of strate-
gic negotiations, the European Commission seems 
committed to undertake far more important com-
munication efforts than for any previous commercial 
agreement. Turkey, for instance, claims to be better 
informed by the EU than it is by the United States. 
But the decision not to make the negotiating man-
date public has aroused suspicion among the member 
states, and that suspicion is all the stronger because 
the transparency aspect is accompanied by an even 
more complex issue concerning consultation and dia-
logue with the stakeholders.
The way in which the European Commission handles 
this communication is going to be an important fac-
tor in the success of the negotiations. The Commission 
cannot stick to mere defensive communication 
designed to reassure the consumer that his or her 
interests are being defended against those of the pro-
ducer. Arguments such as lower administrative costs 
are insufficient to persuade the citizens. It seems far 
better to adopt a positive approach outlining the ben-
efits that can be expected in a sectoral manner.
• Consultation
By the same token, these negotiations also differ from 
traditional commercial negotiations in that they arouse 
the strong expectation of stakeholders, particularly at 
the grass-roots level, that they will be consulted and 
be able to apprise the European Commission of their 
point of view.
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The economic players are already proving to be partic-
ularly pro-active in the defence of their interests. The 
US and European representatives of several economic 
sectors have already submitted almost twenty-three 
jointly devised memos to the negotiators, containing 
their proposals for sectoral mutual recognition.
Consumer defence organisations and other bodies 
representing civil society fear, for their part, that they 
may not be accorded the same treatment in the consul-
tation and participation process as the other economic 
players. They are complaining of an imbalance in the 
sharing of resources between civil society and the 
economic players. While the European Commission 
informs both the economic players and the represen-
tatives of civil society before and after each round of 
negotiations, the representatives of civil society wish 
to be more actively consulted at every stage of the 
talks.
And lastly, the negotiating mandate was assigned to 
the Commission by the Parliament and by the Council, 
and the member states and their political authori-
ties must shoulder their responsibility in promoting 
the project with at grass-roots level, thus maintain-
ing consistent conduct at both the Community and 
national levels without resorting to conflicting rheto-
ric in Brussels and in their respective capital cities.
3.3. Third Countries
The TTIP is in principle less open to the inclusion of 
third countries than certain other broad regional 
accords. The TPP and the Regional Comprehensive 
Economic Partnership (RCEP) in Southeast Asia are 
agreements aiming in the longer term for the broadest 
regional integration possible. While there were nine 
countries involved in the TPP in 2010, countries, such 
as Mexico, Canada and Japan have joined in the nego-
tiations over the last eighteen months. Furthermore, 
the countries in APEC, the Asia-Pacific Economic 
Cooperation forum, have been talking about the 
prospect of regional integration eventually incorpo-
rating both the TPP and the RCEP.
The TTIP negotiations, on the other hand, are cur-
rently restricted to two players and are inaccessible to 
any other partner before an agreement is signed. The 
reaction of China or of other countries to the TTIP is 
particularly ambiguous because the will of the EU and 
of the United States to foster a multilateralisation of 
the agreement is far from being clear as things stand 
today. The first stages in the negotiations hardly offer 
us any clue as to how third countries may track them 
(simple information, or consultation?). The TTIP is in 
danger of causing greater irritation than the TPP; and 
this, despite the fact that the TPP actually encircles 
China in geographical terms.
Yet the impact that the TTIP is likely to have on third-
country exports (for instance the erosion of trade pref-
erences, the risk of hijacking trade flows and so forth) 
is all the more difficult to assess when we consider 
that the numerous trade agreement impact studies 
conducted to date focus essentially on the lowering of 
customs tariffs and offer very few elements for ana-
lysing the impact of regulatory convergence on third 
countries.
The third countries most affected by the impact of 
the TTIP, however, are those trading partners that 
already benefit from the greatest degree of integra-
tion with the two sides involved: countries such as 
Switzerland, Norway and Turkey for Europe, and 
Canada and Mexico in the NAFTA zone for the United 
States. The narrower the regulatory gap and the less 
effort required to adapt to the standards of the new 
transatlantic group, the easier it will be to achieve sig-
nificant economies of scale.
Thus these countries are the first to want to be kept 
closely informed of developments in the negotiations, 
and to demand to be able to participate in them as of 
right now. In view of the economic union that Turkey 
has established with the EU and ongoing negotiations 
that it is conducting to become a fully paid-up mem-
ber of the EU, Turkey is tracking the TTIP issue with 
particular interest, because an agreement might well 
allow it to boost its trade flows with the United States.
The TTIP’s impact on third countries is also going to 
depend on the method chosen to conduct the negotia-
tions. While harmonisation would be both more bind-
ing and more beneficial for those countries, mutual 
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recognition could be even more binding if it were to 
contain restrictive rules governing products’ origin.
If third countries are offered only a consultative role 
allowing them to keep abreast of developments in the 
negotiation process, it remains to be seen whether in 
the longer term they will prefer to await the conclu-
sion of an agreement in order then to potentially sub-
scribe to it themselves, or to seek separate bilateral 
agreements with the United States and with the EU.
4.  What will be the impact 
of the TTIP on world trade?
The TTIP is seeing the light of day in a global context 
characterised by an increasing number of bilateral 
agreements. The EU is strongly committed in verbal 
terms to multilateralism in the field of trade promoted 
by the WTO, but like the United States before it and like 
other countries since the Doha Round ground to a halt, 
it has developed a new bilateral liberalisation strategy.
It is still too early to determine whether this increase in 
the number of bilateral agreements at the global level 
is a stumbling block for multilateralism or whether, on 
the contrary, it may make it possible to impart a fresh 
boost to the method. But the volume of transatlantic 
trade developed by the TTIP and the attraction exer-
cised by this major market will give it a central role 
in the global governance of regulatory environments 
and raise questions regarding its potential impact on 
the dynamics of the international trade system, on the 
WTO’s role and, ultimately, on multilateralism itself.
Is a sweeping regional agreement such as the TTIP 
going to contribute, along with other agreements such 
as the TPP and the RCEP, to undermining the role and 
weight of the WTO in the governance of world trade 
by calling into question its basic underlying principles, 
such as the most-favoured-nation clause, the settle-
ment of disputes and so forth? The sidelining of the 
WTO would be extremely significant because, unlike 
these sweeping regional agreements, the WTO does 
not currently address such issues as competition or 
investment, nor indeed regulatory convergence on a 
broader level – although the prospect of assigning the 
WTO a mandate to monitor regulatory convergence, 
as outlined in a report entitled The Future of Trade: 
The Challenges of Convergence2, deserves more atten-
tion in Brussels.
Also, what impact might it have on the other multilateral 
forums that address regulatory issues (UNFCC, ILO, 
WPO and so forth)? Can the TTIP help to strengthen 
multilateralism – through the recovery of the various 
sweeping regional agreements, including the negotia-
tions currently under way between the EU and Japan?
Applying the results of the TTIP to the broader mul-
tilateral framework of the WTO is an objective that 
ought to be taken into consideration in the context 
of the TTIP negotiations themselves in order to pre-
vent the adoption of positions too distant from those of 
other major trading partners, or to avoid weakening 
the WTO, for instance through the adoption of an inde-
pendent mechanism for settling disputes.
These issues deserve to be debated right now and they 
deserve a clearer commitment from the United States 
and the EU. This, in order to ensure that the United 
States and the EU can continue to be the decision-
makers in imparting a fresh boost to a multilateralism 
and avoid hindering it by prompting a tough response 
from third countries and other regional trade groups.
Conclusion:  What is the timeframe for 
these negotiations?
The timeframe initially envisaged by the United States, 
based on an agreement being reached by the end of 
2014, is hardly realistic. Indeed the timeframe may be 
even longer than planned if complete regulatory con-
vergence is sought, and there is a certain risk involved 
in seeking to negotiate too many issues too fast. Thus 
the first year could be devoted to the more political 
issues involved and could then be followed by more 
technical negotiations. The TTIP requires very care-
ful planning, sequencing of steps and a good anticipa-
tion of the way in which the results of the negotiations 
are to be presented. The TPP, on the other hand, has 
already reached a more advanced negotiating phase 
than the TTIP, and the United States would be able 
to negotiate transatlantic standards from a stronger 
position if the TPP managed to include elements of 
regulatory convergence. The EU has to manage this 
uncertainty, and in view of that it stands to gain from 
taking care not to slow down the TTIP negotiations.
If the EU makes sure not to underestimate any of 
these issues, it could increase its weight in the negoti-
ations and in the future regulation of trade exchanges, 
tactically but also at a strategic level. 
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PROGRAMME
ENGAGING IN THE TTIP NEGOTIATION
LESSONS FROM THE EU’S HISTORICAL AND CURRENT USE OF REGULATORY COMPETITION
WEDNESDAY 27 November 2013 • 10am-3.15pm
EPC - Residence Palace
155 rue de la Loi; B-1040 Brussels 
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In July 2013 the EU and the US launched a long negotiating process to achieve a Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP). 
The scope of the negotiation is more or less agreed but there is still much to be settled as regards the method that will be implemented. 
Further steps require on the one hand a careful look at the Single Market experience and at the functioning of previous agreements with 
trade partners, and the other hand a good anticipation of the impact of a TTIP on the current international trade framework. 
The closed seminar, conducted under Chatham House rules, brings together an average of 35 experts, to scrutinise those issues on the 
basis of short initial presentations. 
10am-10.05am  Welcome address
Fabian Zuleeg, Chief Executive, European Policy Centre 
Yves Bertoncini, Director, Notre Europe –Jacques Delors Institute
10.05am-10.20am  Keynote speech
Pascal Lamy, Honorary President, Notre Europe-Jacques Delors Institute, former director of the WTO
10.20am-12.15am Anticipating TTIP’s geo-economic impact 
Setting global standards: What are the requisites for the world’s largest free trade pact to pave the way for the achievement of global 
standards? Can the aggregation of bilateral agreements be seen as an efficient step before any attempt to re-launch multilateralism? 
Alternatively, may the TTIP take over from the Doha negotiations deadlock by promoting WTO compatible norms, hence laying a corner 
stone for a comeback of multilateralism? How to balance reciprocity and flexibility in a global context? What mechanisms for long term 
regulatory convergence could be envisaged between the two partners and what would the implications of these mechanisms be on trade 
multilateralism? What are the potential repercussions of TTIP on third countries’ economies and on regional trade agreements such as 
EFTA, NAFTA, ASEAN and MERCOSUR? Will there be “winners” and losers”? What would be the impact of TTIP on “Global Value Chains”? 
Would TTIP strengthen or be a substitute to the WTO? Would the position of the US and the EU be reinforced within the WTO?
Closed doors vs direct involvement of third parties: Where do key trade partners stand in the transatlantic project and what reactions 
can be expected from them? How can it be ensured that the position of third-party countries is taken into account or/and that the potential 
repercussions on their economies are adequately addressed in the negotiation process?
Chair:  Elvire Fabry, Senior Research Fellow, Notre Europe – Jacques Delors Institute
Speakers:  Ignacio Garcia Bercero, Director Neighbouring countries, USA and Canada, DG Trade, EC 
 François Heisbourg, Special adviser, FRS
Respondents: Peter S. Rashish, Senior Adviser EPC, former Vice President, Europe and Eurasia, U.S. Chamber of Commerce 
 Paula Wilson, Deputy Ambassador of New Zealand to the EU and Ambassador to Belgium 
Wrap up of the session: Gabriel Felbermayr, Director of the Ifo Center for International Economics (CES Ifo)
12.15am-1.00pm  Lunch break
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1.00pm-3.15pm  Lessons drawn from the Single Market
Harmonisation vs mutual recognition: What are the relative costs and benefits of the two approaches? What was the impact of the 
combination of the two options on the building of the Single Market? What does the shrinking use of mutual recognition tell about current 
EU cohesion and what would the implication in the TTIP negotiations be? Does launching the TTIP negotiation require an acceleration of 
the achievement of the Single Market (i.e. in the service sector)? What type of regulatory cooperation could reconcile a sector specific 
approach favoured by the EU and a more horizontal cross sector approach favoured by the US? 
Producers vs consumers: Does mutual recognition necessarily favour producers’ interests? How to match the defense of the latter with 
consumers’ interests? In broader terms, how should we balance the dismantling of non-tariff trade barriers and the safeguard of European 
collective preferences?
Norm takers vs norm setters: Which method would best suit the TTIP’s negotiation in order to ensure the most extensive agreement 
while promoting European values and norms? What are the lessons to be drawn from previous MRAs and DCFTAs? Would the principle of a 
‘negative’ list of temporary or permanent exceptions allow overcoming discrepancies between US and EU collective preferences? Or would 
it undermine any substantive bridge between those preferences? Will a negotiation confronting different collective preferences favour 
producers more than consumers? How will negotiations over EU and US collective preferences reshape current protectionist strategies? 
Involving civil societies: what lessons can be drawn from the lack of transparency and consultation with stakeholders of the ACTA 
process? How to provide the TTIP negotiation with the necessary political support including in the European Parliament? 
Chair:  Fabian Zuleeg, Chief Executive, EPC
Speakers:  Jonathan Faull, DG Internal Market, EC 
 Marc Vanheukelen, Head of cabinet of Trade Commissioner Karel De Gucht 
Respondents: Bruno Liebhaberg, Director General, Centre on Regulation in Europe (CERRE) 
 Jacques Pelkmans, Senior Research Fellow, CEPS
Wrap up of the session: Joseph Francois, Research Fellow, CEPR
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LIST OF PARTICIPANTS
 - Sami Andoura, Senior Research Fellow, Notre Europe – Jacques Delors Institute
 - Yves Bertoncini, Director, Notre Europe – Jacques Delors Institute
 - Edouard Bourcieu, Deputy Head of Unit Trade strategy, DG Trade, EC
 - Hendrik Bourgeois, Vice President European Affairs, General Electric
 - Claire Dhéret, Policy Analyst, European Policy Centre
 - Dirk De Bièvre, Professor, Antwerp Centre for Institutions and Multilevel Politics (ACIM), University of Antwerp 
 - Elvire Fabry, Senior Research Fellow, Notre Europe – Jacques Delors Institute
 - Jonathan Faull, DG Internal Market, EC
 - Gabriel Felbermayr, Director of the Ifo Center for International Economics (CES Ifo), Munich
 - Joseph Francois, Research Fellow, CEPR London
 - Giorgio Garbasso, Research Assistant, Notre Europe – Jacques Delors Institute
 - Ignacio Garcia Bercero, Director Neighbouring countries, USA and Canada, DG Trade, EC
 - Jennifer Gibson, Communications Assistant, European Policy Centre
 - Bahar Guclu, Commercial Counsellor, Permanent Delegation of Turkey to EU
 - Suparna Karmakar, Research fellow Bruegel, Marie Curie visiting fellow
 - Johannes Kleis, Head of Communications, Director General, BEUC
 - François Heisbourg, Special adviser, Fondation pour la recherche stratégique (FRS)
 - Zaki Laïdi, Director of research, Centre for European Studies, Sciences-Po, Paris
 - Pascal Lamy, Honorary President, Notre Europe – Jacques Delors Institute, former director of the WTO
 - Bertrand de Largentaye, Former Research Fellow, Notre Europe – Jacques Delors Institute, Paris
 - Bruno Liebhaberg, Director General, Centre on Regulation in Europe (CERRE)
 - Anna Lipchitz, Advisor to the French Minister of foreign trade
 - Damien Levie, Head of Unit Trade Relations with North America, DG Trade, EC
 - Henrik Mørch, Director, Governance of the Single Market, DG Internal Market
 - Jean-Frédéric Morin, Professor, Political Science Department, Université libre de Bruxelles
 - Romain Pardo, Junior Policy Analyst, European Policy Centre
 - Yves Pascouau, Senior Policy Analyst, European Policy Centre
 - Eric Peters, BEPA, EC
 - Jacques Pelkmans, Senior Research Fellow, CEPS; Jan Tinbergen Chair in Economics of European Integration and Director of the 
Economics Department at the College of Europe in Bruges
 - Aida Ponce, Senior Researcher, European Trade Union Institute
 - Peter S. Rashish, Senior Adviser EPC, former Vice President, Europe and Eurasia, U.S. Chamber of Commerce
 - Denis Redonnet, Head of Unit Trade Strategy, DG Trade, EC
 - Jim Rollo, Associate Fellow, International Economics, Chatham House 
 - Claudia Schmucker, Head of Program, Globalization and World Economy Program, DGAP, Berlin
 - Ulrich Schoof, Project Manager Future of Employment, Bertelsmann Stiftung
 - Tore Nyvold Thomassen, Deputy Director, Ministry of Trade and Industry, Norway
 - Simon Twisk, Trade Counsellor, Australian Mission to the EU
 - Shahin Vallée, Member of cabinet of Herman Van Rompuy, President of the European Council
 - Marc Vanheukelen, Head of cabinet of Trade Commissioner Karel De Gucht
 - Paula Wilson, New Zealand’s deputy head of mission to the EU and Ambassador to Belgium
 - Selim Yenel, Ambassador of Turkey to the EU
 - Fabian Zuleeg, Chief Executive, EPC
THE TTIP NEGOTIATIONS: A PIRANDELLO PLAY
info@notre-europe.eu 
19 rue de Milan
75009 Paris – France
www.notre-europe.eu
Managing Editor: Yves Bertoncini • The document may be reproduced in part or 
in full on the dual condition that its meaning is not distorted and that the source is 
mentioned • The views expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessar-
ily reflect those of the publisher • Notre Europe – Jacques Delors Institute cannot 
be held responsible for the use which any third party may make of the document • 








1.  In 2013 the customs tariffs that the EU applies to the United States stand at 4.8% (weighted average) for agricultural products and at 1.5% for non-agricultural products, while those applied 
by the United States to the EU stand at 2.1% et 1.1% respectively. 
2.  The Future of Trade: The Challenges of Convergence, Report of the Panel on Defining the Future of Trade convened by WTO Director-General Pascal Lamy, 24 April 2013.
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